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Introduction
A divergence of academic and expert opinion exists on whether informa-
tion and communication technology (ICT) is an inherent force for democ-
ratization, or whether it is merely another tool that authoritarian regimes 
manipulate to achieve their own ends. ICT, understood as electronically 
empowered communications, specifically Internet or cellular network–
based communications and the social media tools it supports, has created 
a paradigm shift as political actors around the world have recognized the 
technology's political significance. In the context of the Middle East and 
particularly the Arab Spring, Western analysis initially hailed ICT as an 
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unstoppable force inherently on the side of freedom, yet hindsight tells a 
different story. The relationship of technology and political power is more 
accurately conceived of as a contested space in which competitors vie for 
dominance, as a neutral tool that is blind to value judgments of good ver-
sus evil. A realist understanding of the nature and limits of technology is 
vital in order to truly evaluate how ICT impacts the relative strength of 
intransigent regimes fighting to stay in power and those on the disadvan-
taged side of power agitating for change. This is particularly relevant 
when examining both regimes that have survived and those that have 
fallen in the wake of the Arab Spring.
As a starting point, it is helpful to explore how firmly rooted regimes in 
the Middle East assess how ICT can be both a threat and an asset. 
Answering how authoritarian regimes in the Middle East adapt to the 
challenges posed by the rise of ICT (or fail to do so) demands an examina-
tion of how states of particular relevance—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and 
Iran—approach ICT from a security perspective. First, a functional sum-
mary of the ICT-related tactics being used by authoritarian regimes will 
be articulated. The tactics identified are then compared and contrasted 
within the framework provided by the case studies of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
and Iran. Finally, policy implications derived from the case studies will be 
explored.
Overview of the ICT Tactics Used by Authoritarian 
Regimes
Authoritarian regimes employ a wide array of tactics to maintain the com-
manding heights in ICT. This is not surprising, given the long-standing 
link between authoritarian rule and control of communication flows.1 
These tactics can be put into the general categories of filtering and sur-
veillance, censorship, infrastructure control, and propaganda.
Filtering and Surveillance
Filtering normally refers to the technical approaches to blocking access to 
information on the Internet, but can also apply to mobile phone net-
works.2 Internet filtering in particular restricts what websites can be 
accessed and what keywords can be searched. Filtering in the form of 
technical blocking can be achieved by Internet protocol (IP) blocking,3 
universal resource locator (URL) blocking via proxy,4 and domain name 
system (DNS) tampering.5 These methods are most often used when the 
blocking targets are out of the reach of domestic security services, that is, 
the offending source is hosted outside of the country. This is particularly 
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apparent when diaspora groups opposed to the current regime form advo-
cacy groups and then remotely try to target audiences within their home 
countries using the Internet.
Another blocking technique uses keywords present in the website's URL. 
Particular keywords are entered as criteria for blocking; a common exam-
ple would be to block search returns on words like "sex" or "porn."6 A 
similar tactic is for search engines to agree to remove search results based 
on criteria provided by the government. This in turn makes the desired 
websites more difficult for Web surfers to find. As a result, security ser-
vices get a double bonus: they deter more casual surfers from stumbling 
across something potentially inflammatory or sordid, and they can also 
identify the machines that doggedly pursue a particular forbidden topic.
Furthermore, techniques can be used to discover the identities of the 
users behind particular IP addresses. Machines are identified by unique 
IP numbers, so if a security service is able to analyze the activity of a 
machine and match it to the pattern of life for a targeted person or group, 
the target becomes particularly vulnerable. When security services reach 
this level of sophistication, activists lose the ability to assume that the 
Web offers any true mask of anonymity. If an activist is operating under 
the assumption of anonymity, while actually under the surveillance of an 
adversary's security service, he could incriminate not only himself but his 
compatriots as well.
Typically, filtering is a way for regimes to maintain cultural and political 
control over their populations. It can be used to ban access to sites that 
are deemed subversive, whether the sites clash with religious and cultural 
values, or are politically seditious in that they criticize or even call for vio-
lence against the regime. Filtering is a mechanism for the regime to send a 
clear signal to its population, because there is little method for making 
restrictions ambiguous. It is transparent to users what can and can't be 
accessed, and it does not take a great deal of imagination for users to see 
why this is so.7
Surveillance, in the context of ICT, can be much more subtle. It is 
approached in many different ways, but the goal is the same: to monitor 
the behavior and to assess the intent of citizens. Surveillance can involve 
the interception of wireless Internet traffic, monitoring packet-switched 
networks (email, chat, Voice over Internet Protocol), monitoring social 
networks, "wiretapping" phone conversations, and using geolocation 
technology to track cellphones.
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With Internet-associated surveillance, regimes can employ policies that 
restrict privacy to deter behavior, or utilize clandestine means for exploit-
ing the perception of privacy. A deterrence approach might include 
requiring Internet cafes to keep records of their customers and what they 
access online, or requiring bloggers to register and get publishing licenses 
from the government. The exploitation aspect of surveillance often 
manipulates technology to gather information. These activities might 
include quietly observing and analyzing a dissident's political views, 
plans, and connections by hacking into social media accounts, installing 
keylogging software on a target's machine, or analyzing photographs and 
videos of a protest to identify the instigators. Another technique is deep 
packet inspection. Deep packet inspection (DPI) enables security services 
to monitor and gather information about users, as well as block certain 
communications.8
A variation on security through surveillance is banning software and 
hardware that make surveillance activities more difficult. The tactic of 
banning software and hardware in order to restrict access is observable 
across the Middle East. This tactic is not unfamiliar, since fax machines, 
satellite dishes, and even photocopy machines have at times been either 
banned or tightly controlled in the region.9 It is also notable that past 
attempts to restrict equipment have often been overcome by widespread 
access to and use of the equipment, as in the case of satellite dishes for 
personal use in Iran. Although a ban may be in place technically, if the 
regime does not have the capability or will to enforce the ban, it is ulti-
mately worthless.
Sometimes even the threat of a ban is enough for companies thirsting for 
market access in the Middle East to compromise the fidelity of their sys-
tems.10 The most widely cited anecdote concerns the threatened ban of 
BlackBerry devices in Saudi Arabia in early August of 2010. The Saudi 
Arabian government had threatened to ban the devices on the grounds 
that the encryption could shield potential terrorist plots from the Ministry 
of the Interior, Saudi Arabia's main security service. The issue was even-
tually resolved when the producers of the BlackBerry, Canadian-based 
Research In Motion (RIM), agreed to share user data with the regime by 
placing a server in the Kingdom to service the Saudi Arabian BlackBerry 
market (BlackBerry servers up until this point had always been central-
ized in Canada). The companies involved called this outcome the "Black-
Berry solution in Saudi Arabia."11
While historical examples of hardware bans may have proved effective, at 
least by making communication more difficult than necessary, the tactic is 
losing ground due to the sheer proliferation of electronics across the 
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region. Mobile phones in particular have become ubiquitous, even among 
poorer segments of society. Per the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), as of 2009 the rates of cellular subscriptions per 100 citi-
zens were 67/100 in Egypt, 71/100 in Iran, and 174/100 in Saudi Arabia.12
Censorship
Censorship, in the context of this paper, is contrasted to filtering tech-
niques insofar as it concerns activities undertaken in reaction to material 
already published and available for public consumption. Essentially, cen-
sorship entails extensive monitoring of online content, especially content 
that is deemed to be culturally offensive or politically subversive. As a 
result, it limits what users can produce and disseminate. Should a user 
post or publish content out of the range of what is acceptable, a site or 
post can be reported, flagged, and taken down. Often, the individual 
responsible for circulating the offending content will be tracked down and 
confronted by the regime. This confrontation might be a stern warning, 
or, in more extreme cases, beatings, imprisonment, and other forms of 
intimidation. These consequences, when both credible and severe, often 
persuade all but the most intrepid citizens to practice self-censorship.
Another approach to censorship is examining what methods regimes pur-
sue to encourage citizens to self-censor. These methods are typically the 
confrontational approaches just discussed: if an author is fearful of being 
physically or legally harassed, he or she will be more careful in choosing 
what content to publish. If there is a perception that the regime is engaged 
is extensive surveillance activities, both on- and offline, the result is a 
chilling effect. Often, the fear of repercussion will result in authors vent-
ing frustrations through allegory. For example, in Egypt during the 
Mubarak era, it was popular to write "fiction" that was actually thinly 
veiled criticism of real events and policies.13
Infrastructure Control
ICT infrastructure includes fixed and mobile telephone networks, com-
puter networks, and installed bases of computing hardware and software 
that support the Internet and telecommunications.14 Other auxiliary com-
ponents include Internet service providers and institutions such as cyber-
cafes, schools, and companies that comply with national monitoring 
efforts. How a regime plans and implements control over physical IT 
infrastructure is indicative of a regime's overall control strategy. A patient 
and comprehensive approach is reflective of a highly strategic regime with 
the means for control. Hallmarks of a sophisticated infrastructure strat-
egy include variations of "kill switches" to quickly disable Internet con-
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nectivity or the ability of the regime to compel telecoms to temporarily 
shut down networks. The point about influence over local telecommuni-
cations companies is important, because a quick, unified shutdown 
requires obedience and responsiveness.
For example, in January 2011, Egypt effectively shut down in-country 
Internet access for a period of roughly five days.15 This could be achieved 
because the Mubarak regime held sway over the major Egyptian telecoms. 
Another reason why Internet access in Egypt could be cut off in such a 
quick and complete manner is the limited number of telecoms in the 
country. In Egypt, just five companies represent the majority of the mar-
ket. This is typical for less competitive markets, especially markets where 
the main competitor is wholly or partially state owned. By contrast, in the 
United States hundreds of companies, including heavyweights like Sprint, 
Verizon, AT&T, and T-Mobile, would have to comply in order to shut 
down the Internet in a similar manner.16
To limit access in a subtle manner, a regime may choose to engage in 
bandwidth throttling. Basically, throttling is a method to decrease the 
speed and performance of Internet connections. It can achieve an effect 
similar to that of shutting down the Internet by making the Internet so 
inconvenient and unreliable that it is no longer an effective tool to inform 
or organize the opposition. The upside of throttling from the perspective 
of a security service is that it is less likely to elicit a passionate backlash, as 
throttling can be carried out subtly and can be attributed to unintentional 
causes.
Propaganda
Propaganda, historically a favorite tool of authoritarian regimes, can be 
disseminated with stunning effectiveness electronically. A regime that is 
savvy enough to use the Internet as a propaganda mouthpiece is often also 
cunning enough to use ICT tools both to fend off criticism and to build 
support from citizens. One example is how authoritarian governments 
have created a veneer of government transparency by creating mecha-
nisms online to receive feedback from citizens and to persuade the popu-
lation that policy choices exist.17 The result is a sense that the regime is 
receptive to the opinions of citizens. If input is received that is unsupport-
ive, it can be easily ignored and erased, while positive statements can be 
gathered and promoted. This system also provides a means to identify 
subversive citizens for monitoring. For example, if the interface is a mes-
sage board, the author of the negative message can then be watched as a 
potential adversary to the regime.
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Propaganda, when done well, can be extremely effective. Propaganda that 
plays to the open nature of the Internet not only is persuasive to internal 
audiences, but is able to gain external sympathizers as well. Additionally, 
carefully orchestrated propaganda can be used to discredit movements 
against the regime. It is worth noting how Iran has seized on the idea of 
producing propaganda that appeals to both Iranian hearts and minds; it 
appeals to consumers by presenting plausible defenses of regime policy, 
and then exacerbates identity politics by fanning the flames of national-
ism. It is starkly suspicious of the West, and seeks to stir up Iranian 
nationalism and promote in-group/out-group sentiments by claiming 
that Islam is under attack from the Western world.
Case Study: Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia, the Arab world's wealthiest and ostensibly most pious 
regime, has both the means and the motivation to put a premium on secu-
rity and stability. The ruling Saud family has maintained power since the 
founding of the country in 1935, and survival of the monarchy is depen-
dent on an aggressive and comprehensive security strategy. Religion also 
plays a role: tight control is exercised over anything that is seen as com-
promising to "Saudi Arabian values," specifically, anything that degrades 
Saudi Arabia's strict interpretation of Islam, or that questions the legiti-
macy of Saud family rule. To enforce cultural and religious norms, the 
Saudi government sponsors the Mutawa'in, or religious police. The 
Mutawa'in are under the auspices of the Committee for the Promotion of 
Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. This group has a central role in assess-
ing the cultural impact of ICT on the cultural fabric of the Kingdom, and 
up until 2006 had almost unrestricted ability to interrogate, detain, or 
arrest citizens on the basis of moral infractions.18
The regime recognizes that the Internet can hamper cultural prerogatives, 
but that it can also be used to enhance them. Saudi Arabia sees the Inter-
net as an opportunity for counterterrorism and counter-radicalization 
efforts.19 For example, an online counter-radicalization program called 
the Sakinah Campaign works to attract would-be radicals seeking reli-
gious guidance. Workers for the Sakinah Campaign then will engage these 
seekers of religious enlightenment in one-on-one online chats to redirect 
them from more violent Islamist groups. The Sakinah Campaign is popu-
lar because it is not affiliated directly with the government, yet it enjoys 
the full support of both the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of 
Islamic Affairs.
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Filtering and Surveillance
To counter culturally and politically threatening content, the Saudi gov-
ernment has implemented a technically complex and expensive system to 
cut off internal access to sites determined to be unfavorable.20 Culturally, 
the Kingdom is dedicated to ensuring strict reverence for Islam, enforcing 
narrow codes for male/female interactions and even "protecting" the pop-
ulace from the influence of Western vices.21
Also, the Saudi royal family is quite sensitive to criticism and political 
opposition, and will block political opposition sites. While censorship lim-
its what can be produced internally, filtering techniques are used to limit 
access to sites that are hosted outside of the country (and therefore out of 
the reach of censors). Two examples of major opposition groups subject to 
filtering are the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) 
and the Movement for Islamic Reform in Saudi Arabia (MIRA). Both are 
groups that are blocked for trying to influence public sentiment against 
the regime in Saudi Arabia.22 The example of MIRA is interesting on two 
levels: the first is because MIRA draws international attention, and the 
second is the continuous cat-and-mouse game played between MIRA and 
the Saudi filterers. On the first point, MIRA draws scrutiny from not just 
Saudi Arabia, but the Western security community as well. The group, 
which is now based in London, has been added to the United Nations 
Security Council 1267 list of terrorist individuals and organizations, 
ostensibly because of affiliations with al-Qaida and other like-minded 
groups. The second is that MIRA has been able to beat the filtering system 
for short intervals of time by simply changing their Web address, which 
then allows their site to slip past the filters.
Additionally, Saudi Arabia's vast financial resources enable it to be a vora-
cious consumer of filtering technology.23 The interest for new and better 
technology is high, and many Western companies recognize the Saudi 
appetite as an opportunity to develop and sell their technologies. Exam-
ples include Narus, a deep-packet-inspection–technology provider (and 
wholly owned subsidiary of Boeing) that counts the Kingdom among its 
Middle Eastern clientele.24
The responsibility for filtering in the Kingdom falls to the Communica-
tions and Information Technology Commission (CTIC), which is Saudi 
Arabia's main regulating body for information and communication tech-
nology.25 In contrast to other actively filtering countries, such as China, 
Saudi Arabia is quite open and transparent regarding what is filtered. 
Users that encounter a restricted page are given the opportunity to dis-
pute the blocking of certain IP addresses. Any user wishing to lodge a 
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complaint should be aware that Saudi ISPs are required to maintain 
records on the identities of their users, and will have to provide those 
records to the authorities if requested to do so.26
Another notable Saudi security tactic is to use the Internet to facilitate 
information gathering. For example, the Saudi Arabian government 
launched YaHajj.com, a trip-planning website for devout Muslims to use 
when planning their Hajj to Mecca. It helps foreign Muslims plan their 
travel to Saudi Arabia, but it also allows the Saudi government to enhance 
their database of passport information and other identifiers of foreigners 
wishing to enter the country.27 This, in addition to visa applications and 
other procedures necessary to enter the country, creates a robust picture 
of foreign travel to and from the Kingdom.
To enhance the ability of Saudi security to intercept electronic communi-
cations, the regime pays close attention to the capabilities of devices and 
software available to its citizens. Thus, the "BlackBerry Solution in Saudi 
Arabia," or the acquiescence of the makers of BlackBerry to allow the 
Saudi government to bypass BlackBerry's encryption and access user 
data, is unsurprising. The Kingdom represents a large and important 
market for companies operating in the Middle East, and even a company 
like BlackBerry could be persuaded to compromise user privacy to main-
tain a foothold in the wealthy nation. The BlackBerry case is also interest-
ing because the Saudi government has a legitimate concern regarding 
encrypted communications and threats to national security.
Censorship
Saudi Arabia's emphasis on upholding Islam informs the Kingdom's 
approach to censoring content on the Internet. But censorship isn't just 
limited to cultural material. As with filtering, content that is deemed to be 
politically subversive is also highly controlled. The threshold for unac-
ceptable political speech is quite low. The royal family is highly sensitive 
to criticism and dissent in general, and content that is negative regarding 
the royal family is aggressively monitored and eliminated.
The Internet Service Unit (ISU), a department of the King Abdulaziz City 
for Science and Technology, leads censorship efforts.28 It is the main 
government authority for the Internet in Saudi Arabia. The ISU is not 
only in charge of selecting and implementing censorship technology, but 
also employs professional censors to comb the Saudi Internet for illegal 
material.29
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The formal security service isn't the beginning and end of censoring work 
on the Web; pious volunteers spend countless hours patrolling chat 
rooms, YouTube, Twitter, blogs, and other forms of social media for 
offensive content. These unpaid volunteers then "flag" the offending sites, 
giving them the nickname "flaggers."30 This could be viewed as a form of 
digital activism, but an activism of the kind that actually feeds paranoia 
and repressive actions by the government.
In addition to the flaggers, Saudi Arabia also keeps close tabs on content 
published online. As of January 1, 2011, all news media blogs are required 
to register with the Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information. Legally, 
this online content is regulated in the same manner as print media. The 
Ministry must approve editors for online news sites in the same manner 
in which they approve editors for paper newspapers.31 Furthermore, only 
Saudi nationals with high school degrees who are at least twenty years of 
age are able to gain the needed license to report news.32
Infrastructure Control
Saudi Arabia built their Internet infrastructure in a highly centralized 
fashion. The Saudi Internet is connected to the global Internet by only two 
nodes, and all Internet service providers engaged in the Saudi market 
must connect through those two nodes.33 These gateways, administered 
by the ISU, are then defended by multiple, redundant firewalls to main-
tain the desired level of filtering.
The Saudi government introduced their public to the Internet in a deliber-
ately cautious fashion. It was not until 1999 that public access was made 
available.34 Up until the early 2000s, the Saudi government intentionally 
kept access costs high, conceivably because they were anxious to see how 
the experiment of introducing the Internet would play out.35 However, 
limited access during this time did not cause distress among the young 
and wealthy. Saudis of means had already been accessing the Internet via 
Bahrain for years. By pursuing this strategy, the Saudi government is pre-
venting the perfect from being the enemy of the good: those truly deter-
mined to bypass the filters and censors can do so, yet the obstacles still 
are successful in deterring more casual users from using the Internet in a 
way that conflicts with the desires of the regime. The widespread use of 
proxy servers also calls into question the notion that limited nodes for 
external connections are fully effective.
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Propaganda
Much of Saudi Arabia's ICT-restriction activities are carried out on the 
grounds of protecting Islam and the culture of the Kingdom. Perfidious 
sites such as those featuring child pornography or those that promote vio-
lence against the government are used as justification for broader restric-
tions. Also, Saudi Arabia has embraced e-governance tools. On the 
surface, this is quite positive. Interfacing with the government via the 
Internet makes citizens feel that the government is accessible and respon-
sive. However, these tools also enable the government to keep an ever-
tighter watch on citizens and to improve their ability to spot and neutral-
ize potential political instigators.
Case Study: Egypt
Egypt is valuable as a case study for numerous reasons: it is heavily popu-
lated and relatively poor, and many citizens outside of the large urban 
areas are illiterate. It is also quite possibly the most visible country radi-
cally affected by the Arab Spring. The now-deposed ruler Hosni Mubarak 
managed his power on the basis of military control and populist rhetoric 
for approximately thirty years. President Mubarak's power seemed 
entrenched until a swift popular uprising in January 2011 overwhelmed 
the government in both velocity and numbers. This uprising embraced 
the Internet as a tool to organize and promote a message of regime 
change, and was able to create a shallow but swift movement that accom-
plished in eighteen days what was thought impossible for nearly thirty 
years.
Political power in Egypt has long been rooted in control of the security 
apparatus; a hybrid approach of populism and military rule allowed for 
Mubarak's lengthy rule. It is important to note how Egypt is different 
from the other cases presented in this article. Unlike its neighbors on the 
Arabian Peninsula, it is not a resource-rich country. Egypt also does not 
have a significant middle class that is well educated. The means for popu-
lation control are quite limited; Egypt does not have the resources to 
achieve high ratios of law enforcement personnel per citizen, nor does it 
have the capability to economically co-opt Egyptian citizens. This plays 
out in how Egypt has approached communications technology. Telecoms 
are generally allowed to flourish, and in many cases the telecoms are the 
business enterprises of those holding political power. Filtering has not 
been pursued by the regime, but surveillance techniques of the low-tech 
variety are adapting to high-tech modes of communication.
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Another point of interest in the case of Egypt is how the revolution has 
drawn attention to communications technology. While social media was 
utilized during the revolution, it is helpful to remember that Facebook 
penetration in January 2011 was only at 5 percent. By April 2011, the rev-
olution had caused a surge in the popularity of the platform, and the per-
centage of Facebook users by population experienced a 42 percent 
increase within the span of four months.36 Another notable statistic 
regarding ICT saturation in Egypt is the vast number of mobile phone 
users. Out of a population of approximately 82.1 million,37 55 million 
Egyptians are cell phone users. By contrast, only 20 million are identified 
as Internet users.38
Filtering and Surveillance
Egypt shows little evidence of employing a filtering strategy. By contrast, 
the Egyptian security apparatus had (and has) an extensive surveillance 
regime. In Egypt, it is not a question of what can be accessed, but what a 
citizen is observed accessing, and especially what they might be saying. 
Speech that is critical of the security services (including the military) and 
Islam is closely monitored. Surveillance is often followed up with beat-
ings, arrests, and other forms of intimidation.
During the January 2011 revolution, authorities arrested thirty-year-old 
Google executive Wael Ghonim. His crime? Running a popular Facebook 
page called "We are all Khaled Said," which brought attention to system-
atic brutality against citizens by the Egyptian police forces.39 Ghonim's 
appeal as an idealistic, educated activist quickly made him a cause célèbre 
in the West. He was detained by the police for twelve days, and was even-
tually released. Blogger Maikel Nabil Sanad was not as fortunate. He was 
arrested in April 2011 for criticizing the lack of transparency in the Egyp-
tian armed forces (among other things). His punishment? A three-year 
prison sentence.40
Another characteristic of Egypt's relationship with ICT is that the lines 
between commerce and security are often blurred. For example, Skype, a 
VoIP-based service that allows customers to make calls cheaply over the 
Internet, has experienced headwinds entering the Egyptian market. This 
is because Skype poses a two-fold problem for Egypt: Skype's encryption 
makes it extremely difficult to monitor conversations for security pur-
poses, and Skype cuts into profit margins for telecoms by providing a 
lower-cost option for long-distance and international phone calls.
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The BBC reported in the spring of 2011 that documents had been discov-
ered indicating Gamma International, a UK-based encryption firm, 
allowed Egypt to experiment with a technology called Finfisher to counter 
the Skype surveillance problem.41 Finfisher operates as spyware: by pos-
ing as a download for a popular application like iTunes, Finfisher can be 
inadvertently installed on a target's machine. The technology can then 
clandestinely record Skype conversations and route the data back to 
another machine.
Censorship
Censorship, defined by this article as a retroactive activity taken in 
response after offending content is posted, has not been extensively 
employed in Egypt. Rather, the threats of beatings or intimidation for 
content critical of the regime and of the security services have encouraged 
citizens to engage in self-censorship.
What is remarkable about the spring 2011 revolution is that the more peo-
ple shunned self-censorship, the more burgeoning bloggers and protest-
ors felt empowered to take to their keyboards, as well as the streets. The 
sharp uptick of participants in the movement quickly overwhelmed the 
security force's capability to respond. People were still being harassed, 
beaten, and arrested, but the sheer velocity of citizens joining the protest 
soon made the final outcome inevitable.
Infrastructure Control
Historically, Egypt has allowed a modified free-market approach to build-
ing out ICT infrastructure. Egypt, lacking the oil resources of Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, felt economic pressures to allow the Internet and mobile 
communications to grow swiftly throughout the regimes. The Egyptian 
military and security services, which are also heavily engaged in Egyptian 
business enterprises, found the economic benefit of ICT proliferation 
enticing. They did not foresee any major sociopolitical issues with the 
increasing adoption of the new technologies; instead they saw the tech-
nology for its potential economic benefit. Case in point: in 2002 the 
regime launched the "free Internet" initiative, which allowed any citizen 
with a phone line and a computer to get online for the price of a phone 
call.42
Although Egypt was not equipped to delay the velocity of events in 2011 in 
the same way that Iran was with its Green Revolution in June 2009, there 
was a significant event on January 27, 2011. Egypt pulled a desperate but 
a technically impressive move: by strong-arming Egyptian telecoms and 
Bryant: The Iron Fist vs. the Microchip
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
Journal of Strategic Security
14
ISPs, Internet and mobile phone services were taken offline for a period of 
five consecutive days.43 Renesys, an Internet analytics firm, observed how 
the major telecoms in Egypt cut access almost simultaneously on January 
27, 2011, at the height of the protests.44 This incident demonstrates both 
what an authoritarian government can and will do if they are backed into 
a corner,45 and the speed at which they are able to achieve their immedi-
ate aims.
However, by the time Egyptian officials had decided to shut down the 
Internet, it was too late for Mubarak. The movement was well past its 
nascent stages, and at this point the Internet was the equivalent of train-
ing wheels, which the movement no longer needed for effectiveness. 
When the Internet shut down, the reaction of the people was not to stay 
inside or to isolate themselves from the surrounding events. Instead, 
thousands of Egyptians poured into the streets to collect "ground truth" 
as to what was really going on. Furthermore, the shutdown incurred an 
economic price tag as well. An intergovernmental think tank, the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), estimated 
the cost of the shutdown at approximately 90 million U.S. dollars.46
What is more difficult to say is how the outcome of events would have 
been affected had the means for mass communication been altered at an 
earlier juncture. There is no satisfying way to prove the counterfactual, 
but the likely conclusion would be that any alteration of a common good 
or service, be it communication or trash collection, would result in 
strained relations between the government and the citizens dependent on 
those services.
Case Study: Iran
Of the three cases presented in this paper, Iran has the most extensive 
and sophisticated strategy to counter disruptive information and commu-
nication technologies. The regime, relative to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, is 
the most paranoid and the most skeptical of foreign influence via the 
Internet and cultural media such as music and movies. Also, Iran uses a 
full spectrum approach to ICT domination. Iran demonstrates compe-
tency in all the tactics presented within the scope of this article. The 
regime takes a comprehensive approach, and commits many resources to 
staying one step ahead of perceived internal and external enemies.
The issue of ICT in Iran is highlighted by the protests following the 2009 
elections. The protests, fueled by widespread allegations among the edu-
cated middle class that the winning party had engaged in large scale vote-
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rigging and fraud, were well documented by Iranian participants on social 
media sites such as Twitter and Facebook.47 When the protests turned 
violent and citizens were beaten and killed, graphic images made their 
way outside of Iran via the Internet. The video of the shooting death of a 
young Iranian woman, Neda Agha-Soltan, by a member of the Basij 
quickly went viral on YouTube.48, 49 The video, shot by a bystander on a 
cell phone, shocked the Western world and became a rallying cry for the 
movement.50 The protests were relatively short lived, but many Western 
commentators quickly dubbed the movement the "Twitter Revolution" in 
reaction to the widespread documentation of the protests on social media. 
Westerners anxious to see Iran liberalize fervently hoped that ICT would 
add to the momentum needed to vanquish a repressive regime hostile to 
the United States.
For as much excitement the Green Movement generated for the West, in 
reality, it was never that widely based among the Iranian population.51 
The misperception of the movement's popularity may have arisen because 
the regime had silenced foreign reporting, and as a result citizen-reported 
media sprang up to fill the vacuum of non-state-generated news. The citi-
zens, using Twitter, YouTube, and other media to get their message out, 
represented the young, educated, and wired supporters of Mir Hossein 
Mousavi and other reformists.52 The Iranian Diaspora, as well as many 
Western reporters, played up the protests as something that could poten-
tially topple the regime.
In the end, communication technologies failed to help the movement 
reach critical mass in terms of committed participation. Ultimately, old 
repression tactics of intimidation used against the protestors proved to be 
enough to squash the movement. Authorities raided dorms, made mass 
arrests, fired upon protestors, and rounded up, detained, and even tor-
tured instigators.53 After the brutal crackdown, the Green Movement 
receded back into the private hopes of reformist citizens and like-minded 
supporters abroad.
Filtering and Surveillance
Iran is a practitioner of pervasive filtering, and is aggressive in seeking 
out and improving upon technologies that allow Iran to achieve its inter-
nal security objectives.54 Filtering is typically carried out through a cen-
tralized system, and the technology used is produced within the country, 
making it more difficult for Western Internet-freedom promoters to cir-
cumvent. Another key factor is that the government enjoys a monopoly 
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over Iran's telecommunications industry. As a result, the government 
faces little resistance when mandating filtering requirements for major 
Iranian ISPs.
Filtering activities have extensive legal cover in Iran. An official policy 
established in 2001 by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution 
requires all access service providers to be capable of blocking access to 
"immoral" and opposition websites. The content bans detailed by the pol-
icy are sweeping. It is forbidden to insult Islam, the Supreme leader, or 
the Grand Ayatollahs, or to "distort" Islamic instructions. Online activities 
degrading or critiquing Khomeni's political views that founded the 1979 
revolution are also subject to blocking. But blocking does not stop at reli-
gious content. During the 2009 protests, access to websites supporting 
the political opposition was denied.55
Censorship
Despite the frailties of the Green Movement, it still caused a tremendous 
reaction from the regime, even well after the movement had subsided. 
The threat to regime stability resulted in the Iran Revolutionary Guard 
Corps' (IRGC) taking a greater interest in preventing the Internet from 
being a tool that could foment unrest against the regime. In the months 
after the June 2009 protests, the regime assembled a twelve-person team 
tasked with unearthing "insults and lies" on Iranian websites. But the 
effort didn't stop there. Once subversive content was discovered, its 
authors were identified and arrested. Additionally, the Internet was used 
to compile photos and videos of protest participants. These select images 
were posted online in publications read by regime supporters, and the 
police requested help in identifying the would-be revolutionaries. This 
open-source policing effort proved effective: one major push on a pro-
Ahmadinejad website produced tip-offs that led to at least forty arrests.56
Infrastructure Control
Iran has built extensive control mechanisms into their Internet architec-
ture, often at the expense of the performance of ICT tools in the country. 
Iran built its Internet in such a way that traffic coming in and out of the 
country goes through a single gateway. As such, the structure is central-
ized, and security measures can be applied uniformly across the country, 
rather than in a piecemeal fashion.57 Furthermore, the single gateway can 
serve as a choke point, and the regime can control the flow of communica-
tions traffic should popular movements against the regime ignite. Allow-
ing high-speed access for households has been a contentious issue, and 
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the notoriously sluggish household access speeds rarely top 128 kilobytes 
per second. This in turn limits the ability of users to enjoy streaming 
audio and video, as well as other multimedia downloads.58
Iran's infrastructure is tightly controlled, but officials are prepared to take 
it one step further with the implementation of a "halal" Internet. This 
would be a closed network (intranet) exclusively available in Iran, and 
would be the only public Internet the Iranian public could access. The 
intent of this new network would be to isolate Iranians from Western 
influences. Iranian officials cite China as the inspiration for this project, 
and indicate that they will be using "foreign consultants" to build the 
intranet.59
Propaganda
In Iran, there is a unit within the national police force launching a counter 
campaign to the perceived dangers of Facebook, Twitter, and other Web 
applications produced by the West. The campaign is focused on students 
and young people, and the deliberate message is that these Western sites 
endanger both the user and Iran. There is a distinct level of paranoia visi-
ble within the structure of the campaign, as leaders claim that Western 
sites that appeal to Iranians are deliberately crafted by the West to influ-
ence internal Iranian affairs.60 That message is also often coupled with 
filtering procedures that block access to Western news outlets such as the 
BBC, Voice of America, the Guardian, Fox News, and CBS.61
The Iranian regime is also aggressive in using scapegoat techniques in 
attempts to deflect criticism for controversial events. The media is then 
used to spread and reinforce messages supporting the regime's version of 
how events occurred. For example, with the shooting death of protester 
Neda Agha-Soltan, the regime came out with several story lines placing 
blame on foreign terrorist organizations, and even the CIA. The fabricated 
versions of events were then repeated both in Iranian media and in inter-
views with foreign press.62 Pressure was put on Agha-Soltan's mother to 
accept payment in exchange for reinforcing the story line that the Iranian 
forces were not responsible for the death of her daughter.63
Also, the regime is highly skilled in using the communicative power of ICT 
to counteract the messaging of protestors. For example, texting is used to 
broadcast the regime's version of public service announcements. One 
regime-generated text carried the following message during the Green 
Movement protests: "Dear citizen, according to received information, you 
have been influenced by the destabilizing propaganda which the media 
affiliated with foreign countries have been disseminating." As in the cam-
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paign to shield impressionable students from the "dangers" of Western 
influence via the Internet, foreign governments are cited as the cause for 
political disruptions. Furthermore, the rest of the text continues by say-
ing, "In case of any illegal action and contact with the foreign media, you 
will be charged as a criminal consistent with the Islamic Punishment Act 
and dealt with by the Judiciary."64 Note that punitive action is threated 
should an Iranian choose to embrace anti-regime sentiments. This is 
something of a hallmark of the regime's propaganda: denounce anti-
regime opinions as the result of foreign influence, and if that is not 
enough to deter budding protesters, threaten severe consequences for 
opposing the regime.
U.S. Policy Implications
In light of the stark realities presented thus far, it is important to restate 
what ICT can and cannot do. ICT is a tool capable of increasing the veloc-
ity of communications and bringing networked populations greater access 
to information. The Internet itself is open and decentralized, but it is also 
highly malleable. It would be incorrect to characterize the approach of 
authoritarian regimes as one of "controlling" information and communi-
cation technology. It would be more accurate to say that success achieved 
by authoritarian regimes comes from an ability to wield the communica-
tive power of ICT. Cunning regimes also find ways for the technology to 
serve their interests, such as using ICT to exploit communications, spread 
propaganda, and gather intelligence on perceived enemies.
The position of the State Department, as articulated by Secretary Hillary 
Clinton in a February 15, 2011, speech, is that U.S. policy should support 
international political freedom of expression on the Internet. This is not a 
new position, but the way in which Internet freedom should be promoted 
has changed. The foreign policy approach of the U.S. government has 
begun to sober to the limits and realities inherent to ICT. In the late 
2000s, enthusiasm for the democratizing powers of the Internet was at its 
zenith. Visionaries thought if protesters were trained in the arts of mod-
ern communication strategies and given the right tools to circumvent fil-
ters and censors, the possibilities would be limitless. To frame this point, 
consider how in the midst of the 2009 Iranian protests promoters for 
democracy and human rights were anxious to send in tools to help the 
protesters circumvent the Iranian regime. When the movement was 
crushed, many ICT idealists were left dazed. The fervor for tools has not 
gone away, but the enthusiasm for technical answers to sociopolitical 
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problems has become more tempered. State Department official Michael 
Posner neatly summed up this sentiment by saying, "Facebook does not 
foment dissent; people do."65
The instrumental approach of providing circumvention technology to 
actors behind a "digital iron curtain" is well meaning but historically has 
failed to meet its objectives. As Clay Shirky advocates in a 2011 Foreign 
Affairs article, the United States should distance itself from the instru-
mental approach of relying on purely technological solutions to help 
activists, as it can often harm as much as it can help.66 Take for example 
the Haystack technology provided in the wake of the 2009 elections in 
Iran.67 Haystack is a technology that emerged in the midst of the 2009 
Iranian protests. Its objective was to mask political websites with innocu-
ous identifiers and to break through Iranian firewalls. The technology was 
not as secure as it was thought to be, and it actually gave the Iranian gov-
ernment the ability to track down individual Haystack users.68
Also, more care should be taken in understanding how authoritarian 
regimes conceptualize security, and how that informs their approach to 
Internet and communications technology. This is an important point to 
understand, especially when the security priorities of an authoritarian 
regime and the United States converge (for example, in counterterrorism 
efforts in Saudi Arabia). If in the rush to promote Internet freedom the 
United States forgets to examine the full context of the security environ-
ment, well-intentioned policy may result in negative unintended conse-
quences. That is not to make a value judgment on the policy of Internet 
freedom, which is perfectly in line with the freedoms the United States 
upholds, but it is to caution that sometimes values and security objectives 
can conflict.
From the U.S. perspective, it remains important to acknowledge the com-
mercial potential of the Internet and view Internet freedom as a mecha-
nism to enhance global prosperity. On the other hand, export-control 
policy helps to slow down the transmission of technology to regimes that 
are at odds with U.S. policy objectives. For example, certain encryption 
technology has the computing capability necessary to defeat strong 
encryption and often needs U.S. government approval to be sold overseas. 
But the challenge is that the United States does not have a monopoly on 
tools that can be used to buttress regimes at odds with U.S. policy. 
Repressive regimes can be served by alternate suppliers or devise ways 
such as alternate transshipment routes to acquire the technology 
desired.69 Additionally, U.S. sellers often track their equipment through 
the initial, legal sale and have no further influence as to subsequent trans-
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fers of their technology after that point. At present, U.S.-produced Web 
surveillance technology ostensibly sold to law enforcement bodies over-
seas is not subject to end-user monitoring agreements.
Ultimately, the realm of ICT is best understood as a contested space in 
which the advantage will go to the most adaptive competitor. ICT is not 
inherently on the side of freedom or tyranny. How the United States or 
any other responsible party chooses to behave in that space does have 
consequences. That is not to say that the best approach is to do nothing 
and let trends take their courses, but that the outcomes to actions taken to 
invigorate online activity can and do have consequences, both good and 
bad.
Conclusion
In essence, authoritarian regimes survive the information age by using 
new tactics to support old strategies. That is, the most successful authori-
tarian regimes in the information age are the regimes that are able to 
wield information and communication technology to support positive and 
negative inducements aimed at their citizens. For example, regimes have 
long engaged in propaganda to blunt reformists and outside influence, 
but savvy regimes are able to use ICT to amplify propaganda that serves 
its interests. A negative inducement is creating an environment of para-
noia, thereby convincing citizens that any effort against the regime is 
being watched and will bear consequences.
Evgeny Morozov, author of The Net Delusion and self-proclaimed "cyber 
realist," assesses the current information environment in one pithy state-
ment: "technology changes over time … human nature, hardly ever."70 
With that in mind, observers of events unfolding in the Middle East must 
assess the social context of information and communications technology, 
and be wary of its limits. To quote Morozov again, "Internet-centrism is 
akin to agreeing to box blindfolded. Sure, every now and then we may still 
strike some powerful blows against our authoritarian adversaries, but in 
general this is a poor strategy if we want to win."71 Technology may act as 
a vanguard, but in reality is not loyal to one side over another. Rather, the 
information environment is best understood as a contested space, and the 
commanding heights will go to those who understand information and 
communications technology in technical, social, economic, political, and 
security-related dimensions.
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